{
  "service": "MarketNow",
  "page": "Trust Roadmap",
  "version": "1.0.0",
  "effective_date": "2026-07-02",
  "url": "https://marketnow.site/trust",
  "summary": "An AI agent reviewer (Claude) reviewed our marketplace and asked for 7 changes. This is our public response \u2014 what we have done, what is partial, and what is still pending. No fluff, no pretending. Every status here is a git commit you can verify.",
  "scorecard": {
    "done": 3,
    "partial": 4,
    "pending": 0,
    "total": 7,
    "peer_reviewed": true,
    "peer_reviewer": "rushabdev (@AmitabhainArunachala)",
    "peer_review_date": "2026-07-12"
  },
  "points": [
    {
      "n": 1,
      "title": "Human-in-the-loop by default, not opt-out",
      "claude_said": "Hoy el dise\u00f1o vende \"no humans needed\" como ventaja. Deber\u00eda ser al rev\u00e9s: humano en el loop por defecto, con l\u00edmites bajos, notificaci\u00f3n de cada compra y revocaci\u00f3n instant\u00e1nea del mandato.",
      "status": "done",
      "what_we_did": [
        "Mandates now default to notificationMode: 'notify' \u2014 every purchase triggers an email or webhook alert to the principal",
        "'silent' mode (no notifications, fully autonomous) requires explicit confirmSilentAutonomy=true field \u2014 it is opt-in, not the default",
        "New 'notify_and_veto' mode adds a 5-minute veto window before each spend commits (on roadmap \u2014 see status below)",
        "Homepage messaging changed from 'no humans needed' to 'Humans set the bounds. Agents act within them.'",
        "Mandates can be revoked instantly from /mandates page \u2014 no waiting period",
        "Hard caps: $500 max total per mandate, $50 max per single purchase (cannot be raised)"
      ],
      "still_pending": [
        "Full veto window implementation (currently notify_and_veto sends the alert but does not block the spend)",
        "Real-time SMS notifications (currently email + webhook only)",
        "Mobile push notifications (PWA in development)"
      ]
    },
    {
      "n": 2,
      "title": "Independent security audit, not self-declared",
      "claude_said": "Que \"Sentinel L1.5\" sea (o est\u00e9 complementado por) una revisi\u00f3n de una empresa externa, con metodolog\u00eda p\u00fablica y reportes publicados \u2014 no un sello que se pone la propia plataforma sobre s\u00ed misma.",
      "status": "partial",
      "what_we_did": [
        "Published the full Sentinel L1.5 methodology \u2014 6 checks documented at /api/audit-skill (AUTH, tool description injection, input validation, CORS, OAuth scopes, rate limiting error leakage)",
        "Sentinel is open source \u2014 anyone can re-run our audit and verify the results. Code at /aep-marketplace/api/audit-skill.js",
        "Added disclosure: every skill detail page now shows 'Sentinel: self-declared' rather than implying third-party validation",
        "Sentinel L1.6 code-complete: enhanced with Semgrep (18 MCP-specific rules for prompt injection, command injection, hardcoded secrets, SSRF), Gitleaks (secret detection), OSV-Scanner (dependency vulnerabilities). Runs via GitHub Actions. See /security.",
        "Sentinel L2 design complete: sandboxed dynamic analysis with gVisor/Firecracker/Docker+seccomp, syscall monitoring, adversarial test inputs. See SENTINEL_L2_DESIGN.md.",
        "Sentinel L2 IMPLEMENTED: Docker sandbox with --network none, --read-only, --cap-drop ALL, seccomp. Runs MCP server in isolation, monitors stdout/fs/network/crashes. Multiplicative scoring on L1.6. Runs via GitHub Actions."
      ],
      "still_pending": [
        "Commission an independent third-party audit. PAID audits (Cure53, Trail of Bits) are on hold until the marketplace generates sales. In the meantime: volunteer peer review open on GitHub, HackerOne free tier, MCP community peer review.",
        "Publish the audit report in full on this page",
        "Integrate L1.6 into production /api/audit-skill endpoint (currently runs via GitHub Actions only)"
      ]
    },
    {
      "n": 3,
      "title": "Real sandboxing when executing skills",
      "claude_said": "Que instalar una skill no d\u00e9 acceso irrestricto al sistema del agente: permisos declarados y limitados por skill (qu\u00e9 archivos, qu\u00e9 red, qu\u00e9 APIs toca), ejecuci\u00f3n aislada.",
      "status": "done",
      "what_we_did": [
        "Added a 'permissions' field to the skill schema \u2014 skills declare what they need (network endpoints, filesystem paths, env vars, subprocess execution)",
        "Skill detail pages now show declared permissions in a visible block before the install command",
        "Sentinel L1.5 audit flags skills that request dangerous permissions (subprocess execution, arbitrary network) with a lower score",
        "Sentinel L2 sandbox IMPLEMENTED: MCP servers now executed in isolated Docker container (--network none, --read-only, --cap-drop ALL, seccomp, 256MB memory). Behavior monitored in runtime."
      ],
      "still_pending": [
        "Official Docker/Firecracker isolation recipe for running untrusted MCP servers",
        "Permission manifest signing by skill maintainer (so the manifest cannot be tampered with post-audit)"
      ]
    },
    {
      "n": 4,
      "title": "Real review before publishing each skill",
      "claude_said": "Revisi\u00f3n real antes de publicar cada skill, tipo lo que hace el marketplace de Cline: mirar actividad en GitHub, identidad del mantenedor, calidad de c\u00f3digo \u2014 no aceptar cualquier paquete npm y ponerle un check verde autom\u00e1tico.",
      "status": "partial",
      "what_we_did": [
        "Replaced the universal 'verified: true' flag with a nuanced 'review_status' field: auto-scanned | human-reviewed | maintainer-verified",
        "Most catalog skills are currently 'auto-scanned' \u2014 Sentinel L1.5 ran, no human has reviewed yet. This is disclosed on every skill detail page",
        "Submission portal at /submit requires GitHub repo URL \u2014 we pull stars, last commit, maintainer account age from the GitHub API"
      ],
      "still_pending": [
        "Human review queue \u2014 currently backlogged. Targeting 24-48h SLA for new submissions",
        "Verified Maintainer program: GitHub identity verification via signed commits (GPG/SSH). Program opens Q4 2026 \u2014 apply at info@alicelabs.site",
        "Public reviewer profiles and review history (so reviewers are accountable)"
      ]
    },
    {
      "n": 5,
      "title": "Catalog transparency",
      "claude_said": "Si esas categor\u00edas con exactamente \"30\" \u00edtems est\u00e1n generadas o rellenadas, decirlo. Mostrar uso real, descargas reales, reviews reales \u2014 no solo un n\u00famero total llamativo.",
      "status": "done",
      "what_we_did": [
        "Created /catalog page explaining how the 8,845 skills were sourced: 5,054 from curated open-source MCP server repos, 3,506 from agent tool inventories, 43 hand-picked as free",
        "Categories with suspicious '30' counts are disclosed as bulk-imported from a single source repo \u2014 they are not individually curated",
        "When a skill has a known GitHub repo, the skill detail page shows real stars, real last-commit date, real open-issue count (pulled live from GitHub API)",
        "When npm install is the distribution method, real weekly download counts from npm API are shown"
      ],
      "still_pending": [
        "Real review system \u2014 currently no reviews exist. We will not seed fake reviews",
        "Real usage metrics (number of installs via our marketplace) \u2014 instrumented, will be public when there is meaningful data",
        "Source-catalog CSV download for full transparency"
      ]
    },
    {
      "n": 6,
      "title": "Payment reversibility",
      "claude_said": "Cripto (USDC) es irreversible por dise\u00f1o. Si van a permitir compras aut\u00f3nomas de agentes, necesitan algo tipo escrow o proceso de disputa \u2014 hoy si un agente compra mal, o una skill factura de m\u00e1s, no hay forma de revertirlo.",
      "status": "partial",
      "what_we_did": [
        "Added explicit disclosure on /skill/[id] pages and at /api/agent-wallet: 'USDC payments are irreversible on-chain. For disputes, contact support@alicelabs.site within 7 days.'",
        "Manual dispute process: email support with the txHash + skillId + reason. AliceLabs will refund from treasury for verified disputes (skill did not work as described, security issue, etc.)",
        "Stripe purchases (credit card) already have full chargeback rights via Stripe \u2014 the agent can route through Stripe when reversibility matters"
      ],
      "still_pending": [
        "On-chain escrow smart contract: USDC payment goes to a time-locked contract, released to seller after 24h cooling-off period unless disputed (targeting Q1 2027)",
        "Automated dispute window for mandates (notify_and_veto mode) \u2014 currently the spend commits immediately, the alert is post-hoc",
        "Public dispute log so users can see how disputes were resolved"
      ]
    },
    {
      "n": 7,
      "title": "Public track record over time",
      "claude_said": "Identidad verificable del equipo, cobertura de terceros, historial sin incidentes sostenido. Esto no se arregla con un cambio puntual, se construye.",
      "status": "partial",
      "what_we_did": [
        "Created /about page with team identity: AliceLabs LLC (USA (Wyoming)), founder Edison Flores, public GitHub at github.com/edgarfloresguerra2011-a11y",
        "This /trust page is itself part of the track record \u2014 every status change is a git commit, visible in the repo history",
        "Public roadmap below shows what we have done and what is still pending \u2014 no pretending things are done when they are not"
      ],
      "still_pending": [
        "Sustained incident-free operation (this is built, not announced) \u2014 6 months minimum to claim",
        "Third-party coverage (Hacker News, TechCrunch, etc.) \u2014 pitch in progress",
        "Bug bounty program (currently we operate a private one; public launch when 1,000 active mandates exist)",
        "Security incident disclosure policy (drafted, pending legal review)"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "commitment": "We will not claim 'verified' or 'trusted' status we have not earned. Every status on this page is a git commit visible in our public repo. When something moves from 'pending' to 'done', you will see it here first.",
  "commit_history_url": "https://github.com/edgarfloresguerra2011-a11y/marketnow/commits/master/aep-marketplace/src/pages/Trust.jsx",
  "related_pages": {
    "about": "https://marketnow.site/about",
    "catalog": "https://marketnow.site/catalog",
    "mandates": "https://marketnow.site/mandates",
    "security": "https://marketnow.site/security",
    "policies_json": "https://marketnow.site/api/policies.json"
  },
  "peer_reviews": [
    {
      "reviewer": "rushabdev (@AmitabhainArunachala)",
      "date": "2026-07-12",
      "scope": "Payment verification, mandate ledger, x402 implementation, Sentinel audit pipeline",
      "findings_total": 11,
      "findings_fixed": 11,
      "findings_remaining": 0,
      "url": "https://github.com/edgarfloresguerra2011-a11y/marketnow/issues/2",
      "disclosure": "Independent, free, unpaid review. Reviewer runs a live x402 seller service (Revenue Dojo API on Base).",
      "credibility": "This is the first independent peer review of MarketNow. It validates our security fixes (TOCTOU, fail-closed, EIP-191, webhook SSRF) and identified 11 improvement areas \u2014 all now fixed."
    }
  ]
}